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Abstract 
 
An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of 
the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying 
more than two decades of growth resurgence.  This study builds on a critique of Piketty’s 
‘capital in the 21st century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to 
review empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty 
in SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental 
characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, 
political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that 
regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the post-2015 
agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight 
policies.  
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1.  Introduction 
 There are at least four reasons for reviewing Asongu (2014a) on ‘Fighting African 
Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy Harmonization’: (i) recent disturbing extreme 
poverty trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); (ii) a critique of Piketty’s ‘capital in the 21st 
century’ that builds on capital flight to elucidate the sub-region’s extreme poverty tragedy; (iii) a 
recent methodological innovation for common policy initiatives based on negative 
macroeconomic and institutional signals (reverse Solow-Swan) and (iv) the imperative to 
account for more fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development in order to avail 
room for robustness and more policy implications.  
 First, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world, with the exception of Africa, where 45% of countries in SSA are 
substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015). As 
documented in recent literature (Efobi et al., 2018; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Tchamyou, 
2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019; Asongu & le Roux, 2017, 2019), whereas extreme poverty 
has been declining in all regions of the world, it has unfortunately been increasing in SSA. This 
is despite over two decades of growth resurgence that began in the mid 1990s.  
 Second, building on the increasing poverty levels in SSA, Asongu and Nwachukwu 
(2016a) has presented a critique of Piketty’s (2013) ‘capital in the 21st century’. Building on: (i) 
responses from Kenneth Rogoff  and Joseph Stiglitz; (ii) post Washington Consensus paradigms 
and (iii) underpinnings from Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana  and Solow-Swan, Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016a) conclude that extreme poverty in SSA would increase as long as the return 
on political economy (or illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate in the sub-region.  
 Third, a recent stream of literature is building on theoretical underpinnings of 
neoclassical growth models to propose the need for common policies based on negative 
macroeconomic and institutional signals. In essence, whereas the theoretical underpinnings of 
income convergence have exclusively been limited to catch-up in positive signals, a new stream 
of literature is evolving on catch-up in negative signals. According to this stream, it is more 
relevant to initiate common policies based on negative signals because these are policy 
syndromes by conception and definition. The three studies in this stream of literature are to the 
best of our knowledge: (i) Asongu (2013a) on harmonizing policies against software piracy; (ii) 
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Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) who have predicted the 2011 Spring using negative signals in 
institutional and macroeconomic variables and (iii) Asongu (2014a) on benchmarking policy 
harmonization against capital flight in SSA. 
 Fourth, Asongu (2014a) has used two fundamental characteristics to project horizons for 
common policies against capital flight in SSA. We extend the underlying study by accounting for 
income levels, legal origins, regional proximity and religious domination. In essence, accounting 
for more fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development is essential in order to 
avail room for robustness and more policy implications. Accordingly, upholding blanket policies 
in the battle against capital fight may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental 
characteristics and prevailing trajectories of capital flight in SSA. Hence, policy makers are most 
likely to ask the following three questions before considering the harmonization of policies on 
capital flight. (1) Is capital flight converging within SSA? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing 
of the convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental characteristics of capital flight 
do answers to the first and second questions apply? While an answer to the first question will 
guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the answer to the second will determine 
an optimal timeframe for the blanket policies.  But ultimately, the answer to the third (given that 
the first and second questions are already answered), will determine the feasibility-of, 
timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the common policies. This third 
question is most relevant because it underlines the need for common policies to be contingent on 
the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) convergence within each identified 
fundamental characteristic of capital flight.  
 The positioning of the research also departs from contemporary literature on capital flight 
which has been oriented towards, inter alia: the connection between fiscal policy and capital 
flight (Muchai & Muchai, 2016); lessons on causes and effects of capital flight from Africa 
(Ndikumana, 2016); the connection between capital flight and public social expenses in 
Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa  &  Rakotomanana, 2016) and Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 
2016); insights into relationships between misinvoicing in trade and the flight of capital from 
Zimbabwe (Kwaramba  et al., 2016); the nexus between natural resources and capital flight in 
Cameroon (Mpenya et al., 2016); how capital flight is related to tax income in Burkina Faso 
(Ndiaye & Siri, 2016); linkages between terrorism, capital flight and military expenditure (Efobi 
& Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018); the institutional environment on the 
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nexus between capital flows and capital flight (Gankou et al., 2016); the bundling and 
unbundling of institutions in the fight against capital flight (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017) and 
how terrorism sustains the addiction to capital flight (Asongu et al., 2019). 
 The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the data 
and methodology. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 3 while 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 The research focuses on 37 countries in Africa building on data for the period 1980 to 
2010 from a plethora of sources: Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a); the African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank.  The geographical and temporal scopes of the research are contingent on the availability of 
data at the time of the study.  The capital flight data come from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) 
and at the time of study only 37 countries are available for the corresponding periodicity. 
Insights into the sampled countries and related categories are disclosed in Appendix 4. In what 
follows, some essential points surrounding the selection of data are clarified, notably: (i) the 
determination of fundamental features, (ii) how the capital flight measure is comparable and 
compatible and (iii) choice of control variables.  
 
2.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
 Building on the attendant scholarship, it is not feasible to establish convergence when 
sampled countries exhibit much heterogeneity (Asongu, 2013a). It is in view of improving the 
homogenous characterization of the dataset that the dataset are classified based on some 
fundamental characteristics pertaining to capital flight. In the choice of these fundamental 
features, governance (inter alia, regulation quality, corruption-control and transparency) and 
macroeconomic features are have the shortcoming of being dynamic over time. Therefore, an 
adopted threshold may be inconsistent within the sampled periodicity, especially given the length 
of the sample (i.e. a 30 year span).  
 In the light of the above, the research builds on Weeks (2012) in the selection of the 
fundamental features, namely: petroleum-exporting and conflict-affected countries, inter alia. To 
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these features, this study includes the following categorizations: religious domination, legal 
origins and income levels. Whereas the categorization approach employed by Weeks (2012) is 
exclusive, there is a consensus in the literature that “conflicts” and political strife as well as a 
sector that is petroleum-dominated influence the macroeconomic performance of African 
countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, there are some apparent issues in the 
assignment of countries to the selected categories on an exclusive and non-arbitrary basis. In 
order to avoid repetition, more information on the adopted categories can be found in Asongu 
(2014a) which has built on a body of literature for the categorization of countries, notably: 
Weeks (2012), Boyce and Ndikumana (2003, 2012a), La Porta et al., (1998, 1999), Asongu 
(2014b).  
 
2.1.2 Comparability and compatibility of the capital flight measurement  
 
 There are two principal shortcomings associated with the capital fight measurement: (i) it 
is not compatible with underpinnings of the convergence theory and (ii) it is not comparable with 
other variables in the study. In essence, the measurement of capital flight from Boyce & 
Ndikumana (2012a) is disclosed in constant 2010 million USD. Two consequences can be drawn 
from the nature of the indicator: on the one hand, the indicator cannot be compared with 
attendant control variables that are largely represented in current USD GDP ratio and on the 
other, the indicator is incompatible with the GDP-centric endogenous indicators from the 
attendant convergence scholarship. In order to tackle the discussed concerns, this study is 
consistent with Asongu (2014a) by first converting current GDP to constant 2010 terms. The 
value obtained is then divided by 1 000 000 from which, values in terms of “GDP constant of 
2010 USD (in millions)” are obtained. The last step of the process consists of dividing the capital 
flight values from the second step by “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. As apparent in 
Appendix 1, the transformation produces a measurement of capital flight that is: (i) compatible 
with both the theoretical underpinnings pertaining to the convergence literature on the one hand 
and (ii) compatible with the other variables, on the other 
 
2.1.3 Control variables  
 In accordance with Asongu (2014a), 14 variables are adopted for the conditioning 
information set. These elements in the conditioning information set are used in two distinct 
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specifications that account for both trade and financial globalization (i.e. trade openness, private 
capital flows and foreign direct investment), expenditure of the government (i.e. public 
investment and government spending), economic prosperity (i.e. GDP per capita growth and 
GDP growth), institutional quality (i.e. rule of law and regulation quality), the stability of prices 
(i.e. inflation), financial development (i.e. liquid liabilities and money supply) and development 
assistance (entailing total foreign aid and foreign aid from the DAC2 countries). It is worthwhile 
to clarify that the choice of the variables is consistent with the theoretical insights into 
conditional convergence which maintain that if there are disparities between countries in 
institutional and macroeconomic features that are exogenous to capital flight, conditional 
convergence is likely to be apparent. According to Asongu (2015), globalization drives capital 
flight. Boyce and Ndikumana (2012b) maintain that one of the most critical mechanisms via 
which government funds are stolen is through public spending. Weeks (2012) posits that capital 
flight is associated with high dependence on foreign aid and low quality of institutions. It has 
been documented in the literature that investors prefer investing in economies that are less 
characterized by features of ambiguity (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018) such as very high 
inflation. In line with Boyce and Ndikumana (2003), high levels of economic growth that are not 
driven by petroleum exports are linked with lower levels of capital flight, in the light of higher 
anticipated returns from investment. Insights into the summary statistics, correlation matrix and 
definitions of variables are presented respectively, in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
This research uses the beta (β) convergence technique that is in line with the 
methodological motivations of the paper, consistent with the bulk of literature on the imperative 
of the adopted estimation technique to be consistent with data behavior and study objective 
(Chao et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Li et al., 2014, 2016; Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 
2019b). This procedure of estimation is typically in line with the income catch-up scholarship 
that has been assessed building on models of neoclassical growth, notably: Baumol (1986); 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) and Mankiw et al. (1992). The attendant theoretical 
insights have been extended to other areas of development studies, inter alia: financial markets 
                         
2
 Development Assistance Committee.  
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and financial intermediary developments (Narayan et al., 2011; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; 
Tchamyou et al., 2018; Efobi et al., 2019).  
Following the attendant convergence studies (Fung, 2009; Asongu, 2013), Eq. (1) and 
Eq. (2) below are the main specifications used to assess conditional convergence if  tiW ,  is taken 
as strictly exogenous.  
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(    
   
                                                  (1) 
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln(    
                                                                      (2) 
 where tiY ,  represents the measure of capital flight of country i  in period t.  ı = 1+ β.   tiW ,  
denotes a  vector of capital flight determinants,  i  reflects a country-specific effect,  t  is a 
time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. In the light of the neo-classical growth 
underpinnings discussed in the preceding paragraph, a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on   in Eq. (1) implies that, countries which are comparatively close to their steady 
states in terms of changes in capital flight will be characterized by a slowdown in the increase of 
capital flight growth (Narayan et al., 2011). Within the same framework, as documented in Fung 
(2003) and in contemporary literature on convergence if  10   in Eq. (2) , it follows that tiY ,  
is stable dynamically with a capital flight growth rate trend that is similar to that of  tW , and with 
a corresponding height relative to the level of tW .  These indicators are encapsulated in tiW ,  
and the individual effects i  are measurements of the long term capital flight convergence path. 
It follows that the country-specific effect i  articulates other drivers of the steady state of the 
country that are not observed in tiW , . 
 In order to eliminate fixed effects that can cause endogeneity owing to the correlation 
between the lagged outcome variable and fixed effects, the difference of Eq. (2) it taken to 
produce Eq. (3).  
 
)()()()ln()ln()ln(
,,,,2,,2,,,,     titititititititititi WWYYYY
       (3) 
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) are then combined within a framework of a system Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) that ensures parallel conditions between the dependent variables 
and error terms by using lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in Eq. (2)  lagged 
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levels of the regressors as instruments in Eq. (3). The choice of the difference estimator of the 
GMM technique (Arellano & Bond, 1991) relative to the system estimator of the same technique 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is motivated by the need to obtain more 
efficient estimates as documented by Bond et al. (2001). The specification is two-step in order to 
account for heteroscedasticity.  
As maintained by Islam (1995, 14), it is not appropriate to assess convergence using 
yearly time spans because these are too short and consequently, short term disturbances may 
persist during such short time spans. Therefore, given a dataset spanning 31 years, the research 
follows Asongu (2013a) in employing two-year data averages in terms of non-overlapping 
intervals (NOI). In addition to the justification provided above, four more additional motivations 
are worth clarifying. (i) While NOI that are characterized by higher numerical values absorb 
more short term disturbances, there is also an associated shortcoming of having estimated 
models that are weakened in the light of the information criteria used to assess and validate the 
estimated models. Therefore, the selection of the two-year NOI over NOIs with higher numerical 
values is also motivated by the need to take on board as many time series properties as possible. 
(ii) As a corollary to the preceding point, two-year NOI are associated with more degrees of 
freedom that are relevant for the modeling of conditional convergence.  (iii) Consistent with 
Asongu (2013a), the choice of higher numerical NOI comes with the cost of low convergence 
rates and corresponding lengthier time spans to full convergence which may not reflect the 
reality on the ground. For example a policy recommendation with AC and CC of 47.9 years and 
40.3 years respectively (based on the three-year NOI) for petroleum exporting countries (in the 
system GMM results) may not be welcomed by policy makers because it is a distant prospect 
and does not reflect the urgency of the capital flight issue under consideration.  
 (iv) From an exploratory visual analysis, it is apparent that evidence of persistence in 
short term or business cycle disturbances is not associated with capital flight. Hence, the 
coefficient of auto-regression is 2 (i.e. Ĳ is set to 2) and the research computes the implied 
convergence rate by calculating ı/2. Accordingly, the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
difference outcome variable is divided by the number of NOI (i.e. 2) because it has been 
employed to absorb short term disturbances. In essence, the criterion for assessing convergence 
is that the absolute value of the estimated lagged coefficient should be between the interval of 
zero and one ( 10   ). Hence, when the estimated lagged dependent variable falls within the 
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interval in a specific fundamental characteristic, convergence can be established. The 
corresponding interpretation is that past variations induce a less proportionate influence on future 
variations, indicating that the difference in the left-hand side of Eq. (3) is decreasing over time 
given that the country is converging to a steady state (Asongu, 2013).  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1 Presentation of results 
This section looks at three principal concerns: (i) investigation of the presence of 
convergence; (ii) computation of the speed of convergence and (iii) determination of the time 
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall findings is presented in Table 1 in 
which the three concerns are addressed. Findings for absolute (unconditional) and conditional 
convergence are presented in Table 2 and Tables 3-4 respectively.  
Absolute convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of the endogenous 
variable as independent variable whereas conditional convergence is in the presence of the 
conditioning information set (control variables). Hence, unconditional convergence is estimated 
without tiW , : vector of determinants (government expenditure, trade, FDI, GDP growth, 
regulation quality, financial depth, development assistance and inflation) of capital flight3. 
Accordingly, in order to assess the validity of the model and indeed the convergence hypothesis, 
we perform two tests, notably: (i) the Sargan test which assesses the over-identification 
restrictions and (ii) the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which examines the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test investigates if the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the stance that the 
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from endogeneity), which is 
necessary for the validity of the GMM estimates. The p-values of estimated coefficients are 
disclosed in brackets in the line following the reported values of the estimated coefficients. We 
broadly observe that the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is not rejected in all the regressions. 
Priority is given to the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) test in first difference because it is 
more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in difference.  For almost every model, we 
are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation, especially for 
                         
3
 Note should be taken of the fact that, the second vector of determinants entails the second set of control variables 
as presented in Table 4 (public investment, trade, private capital flows, GDP per capita growth, rule of law, liquid 
liabilities, development aid from DAC countries and inflation).  
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conditional convergence specifications. Therefore, there is robust evidence that most of the 
models are free from autocorrelation at the 1% significance level. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the findings from Tables 2-4.  This entails results for 
Absolute Convergence (AC), Conditional Convergence (CC), the Speed of Absolute 
Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to 
achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences.  
From a general perspective, the following conclusions could be drawn. (i) Conditional 
convergence findings based on the second specification (Table 4) are substantially more 
significant than those based on the first specification (Table 3). Therefore, conditional 
convergence is based on the variables we observe and empirically test (or model), which may not 
reflect all determinants of capital flight that facilitate the convergence process. Hence, the 
discussion of findings will be based only on the second specification for conditional 
convergence. (ii) Based on continental results, findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘σorth Africa’ 
‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect 
the absolute convergence process. In other words, these fundamental characteristics have rates of 
convergence that significantly differ from the 33.05% per annum observed for the African 
continent. Their respective degrees of convergence are much lower, implying a corresponding 
lengthier period required for full convergence: with the disparity most pronounced in ‘Middle-
income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries which both have a 2%  per annum convergence 
rate and a time needed for full convergence of 100 years. (iii) Within the perspective of CC, but 
for the ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly 
consistent across other fundamental characteristics. (iv) Regardless of fundamental 
characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is 
between 2016 and 2023.  
 
3.2 Discussion of results 
Before we dive into the discussing the results, it is important first and foremost to 
understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence of capital 
flight in the African continent. Absolute convergence in capital flight occurs when countries 
share the same fundamental characteristics with regard to bases governing capital flight such that 
only cross-country variations in initial levels of capital flight exist. Absolute convergence thus, 
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results from factors such as, inter alia: significant export of petroleum; political instability due to 
conflicts; the emphasis legal origin places on property rights, enforcements of the rights and fight 
against corruption; the manner in which economic prosperity affects the propensity by which the 
extra-wealth is saved abroad. Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common 
to fundamental characteristics (conflict-affected, high-income or English common-law countries 
for example). Hence, based on the above intuition we could expect capital flight to be higher in 
petroleum and conflict-affected countries. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
speedy convergence because of disparities in initial conditions of capital flight. These differences 
in initial conditions depend on: (i) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, 
either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions; (ii) spontaneous 
reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of 
peace accords and (iii) the diffusion of legal cultures transmitted by colonial powers over time 
through regionalization and globalization such that the legal origin fundamental holds less 
ground. 
 On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on cross-country 
disparities in structural and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. In 
accordance with the economic growth literature (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995), conditional 
convergence depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one’s own long-term steady state 
(equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and fundamentals of its institutions in 
particular and its economy in general. For example, non-petroleum exporting countries may 
differ significantly in the level of globalization, institutional quality, economic prosperity, 
financial development,  price stability, foreign aid…etc To this end, our model for conditional 
convergence is contingent on institutional quality (rule of law and regulation quality), 
globalization (trade, FDI and private capital flows), financial development (at overall economic 
and financial system levels), economic prosperity (GDP growth at macro and micro levels), 
inflation and development assistance (total NODA and NODA from DAC countries)4. Due to 
constraints in degrees of freedom, some models have not been conditional on all the 
determinants of capital flight outlined above. This is not a major issue because some conditional 
                         
4
 FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance 
Committee.  
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specifications in mainstream literature are limited to two macroeconomic control variables 
(Bruno et al., 2012).  
 We have observed the following from the findings. (i) Based on continental results, 
findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘σorth Africa’ ‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and 
‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect the absolute convergence process. The 
corresponding lower (higher) rate (time) of (to full) convergence is the result of differences in 
initial conditions of capital flight. For instance, the difference in petroleum countries could be 
explained by significant variations in initial conditions of capital flight discussed above: time-
dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or 
substantial decline in productions. (ii) Within the perspective of CC, but for the ‘Conflict-
affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly consistent across 
other fundamental characteristics. ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries significantly 
have a higher (lower) rate (time required) of (for full) conditional converge because of 
substantially lower cross-country differences in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics 
determining capital flight. Hence, cross-country differences in factors governing capital flight 
among “Conflict-affected” and “Low-income” countries are not very substantial. (iii) Regardless 
of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. This empirically indicates that (both in absolute 
and conditional terms) countries with lower rates of capital flight are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher rates. Consistent with the intuition motivating this analysis on policy 
harmonization, two inferences could be drawn: (i) on the one hand, convergence implies that, 
adopting common policies against the scourge is feasible and  (ii) full (100%) convergence 
within the specified time horizon reflects the implementation (or harmonization) of the feasible 
policies without distinction of nationality or locality.  
 
4. Concluding implications and future directions 
An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of 
the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying 
more than two decades of growth resurgence.  This study builds on a critique of Piketty’s 
‘capital in the 21st century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to 
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review empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty 
in SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental 
characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, 
political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that 
regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the post-2015 
agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight 
policies. Common capital flight policies are not exclusively contingent on capital flight leaving 
one of the sampled countries to another. It is premised on the fact that common capital flight 
policies can be applied by sampled countries to avoid capital leaving their countries to more 
developed countries and tax havens. Common capital flight will benefit sampled countries 
because capital flight is largely destined to wealthy countries and/or tax havens under the 
jurisdictions of wealthy countries. The implementation of common policies can be tailored 
within the auspices of the African Union because the African Union is currently spearheading 
the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa. 
Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the following four points are relevant concerns that 
need to be resolved to facilitate this harmonization: improvement of the investment climate and 
ease of doing business to deter capital fight based on prospects of higher returns; formulation of 
common policies that would culminate in the repatriation of corruption-related capital flight 
deposited in Western banks and the improvement of formal institutions that will oversee the 
recuperation for this stolen capital (as well as deter potentially corrupt officials); involvement of 
Western banks in particular and the international community in general and; challenging the 
legitimacy of part of African debts. The purpose of this study has been to project more horizons 
for common policies against capital flight in Africa using more fundamental characteristics. 
More insights into policy measures against the underlying capital flight are available in Fofack 
and Ndikumana (2009), Boyce and Ndikumana (2011) and Asongu (2014a).  
 Future studies devoted to extending extant literature may focus on more contemporary 
measures that are being tailored towards fighting illicit capital flight in the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda. 
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Table 1: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
 Panel A: Absolute Convergence with Specifications in Table 2 
Absolute C (AC) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
% of A.C 2% n.a 2% 33.10% 33.05% 12.50% 33.05% n.a 33.05% 17.70% 15.55% 33.05% 33.11% n.a 33.05% 
Years to A.C  100Yrs n.a 100Yrs 6.04Yrs 6.05Yrs 16Yrs 6.05Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs 11.2Yrs 12.8Yrs 6.05Yrs 6.04Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs 
                
 Panel B: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 3 
Conditional C (CC) No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No 
% of C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 11.10% n.a n.a 11.25% n.a n.a n.a 
Years to C.C  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 18.1Yr n.a n.a 17.7Yrs n.a n.a n.a 
                
 Panel C: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 4 
Conditional C (CC) Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
% of C.C 16.6% n.a n.a 20.05% n.a 16.40% 16.40% n.a 16.55% n.a 15.65% n.a 29.75% 16.88% 16.50% 
Years to C.C  12Yrs n.a n.a 9.97Yrs n.a 12.1Yrs 12.1Yrs n.a 12Yrs n.a 12.7Yrs n.a 6.72Yrs 11.8Yrs 12.1Yrs 
                
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-
law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: 
Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Dom: Domination.  
 
Table 2: Absolute Convergence 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  0.04*** 0.092 0.04*** 0.662*** 0.661*** -0.25*** 0.661*** 0.167 0.661*** 0.354** -0.31*** 0.661*** 0.662*** -0.077 0.661*** 
 (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) 
AR(1) 0.994 -1.381 0.939 -1.051 -1.005 -1.078 -1.056 -1.647* -1.057 -1.398 -1.000 -1.009 -1.001 -0.773 -1.057 
 (0.320) (0.167) (0.347) (0.293) (0.314) (0.280) (0.290) (0.099) (0.290) (0.162) (0.317) (0.312) (0.316) (0.439) (0.290) 
AR(2) -0.999 0.676 -0.998 -0.991 -1.010 -0.921 -1.002 0.525 -1.002 -1.244 -1.038 -1.009 -0.999 -0.727 -1.002 
 (0.317) (0.499) (0.318) (0.321) (0.312) (0.357) (0.316) (0.598) (0.316) (0.213) (0.299) (0.312) (0.317) (0.467) (0.316) 
Sargan OIR 4.854 10.928 14.590 7.313 2.567 18.113 11.487 8.424 14.870 3.207 6.594 7.191 6.012 21.551 15.022 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Wald 674*** 0.055 938*** 8e+5*** 2e+6*** 25*** 4e+5*** 0.645 4e+5*** 4.69** 2087*** 2e+6*** 7e+7*** 0.488 442672*** 
 (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) 
Countries  5 11 16 19 15 20 25 10 31 4 8 27 11 24 35 
Observations  70 158 233 271 219 285 359 145 444 60 115 389 161 343 504 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries.  Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) 
no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 3: Conditional Convergence (First Specification) 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  -0.011 -0.130 -0.003 -0.318 -0.015 -0.297 -0.219 0.566 -0.222* 1.247 0.002 -0.22** -0.060 0.005 -0.215 
 (0.932) (0.813) (0.976) (0.398) (0.897) (0.187) (0.158) (0.667) (0.086) (0.451) (0.996) (0.044) (0.940) (0.949) (0.104) 
Constant  0.051 0.013 0.145 -0.072 -0.136 -0.247 -0.0002 -0.073 -0.068 -0.002 -0.043 -0.193* -0.064 0.011 -0.044 
 (0.480) (0.693) (0.618) (0.644) (0.346) (0.430) (0.997) (0.404) (0.620) (0.976) (0.632) (0.097) (0.724) (0.914) (0.695) 
Gov’t  Expenditure  -0.002 -0.0002 -0.008 0.0002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.897) (0.709) (0.184) (0.939) (0.276) (0.722) (0.074) (0.590) (0.399) (0.441) (0.983) (0.806) (0.735) (0.128) (0.483) 
Trade -0.0004 0.000 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.000 0.0003 0.0001 --- 0.001 0.0004 0.002 0.0001 0.000 
 (0.776) (0.933) (0.549) (0.875) (0.775) (0.491) (0.805) (0.804) (0.735)  (0.505) (0.422) (0.585) (0.746) (0.937) 
Foreign Direct Ivt.  --- -0.002 -0.0005 -0.004 0.0002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.0001 --- --- -0.0002 --- -0.001 0.001 
  (0.152) (0.838) (0.768) (0.942) (0.715) (0.560) (0.765) (0.970)   (0.929)  (0.755) (0.676) 
GDP Growth  --- 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.021 --- --- 0.033* --- 0.017 0.019 
  (0.361) (0.631) (0.308) (0.501) (0.270) (0.270) (0.461) (0.304)   (0.055)  (0.401) (0.274) 
Regulation Quality  --- --- -0.020 -0.149 -0.054* -0.090 -0.009 --- -0.041 --- --- -0.019 --- 0.007 -0.04** 
   (0.533) (0.367) (0.078) (0.545) (0.751)  (0.210)   (0.663)  (0.868) (0.043) 
Financial Depth  --- --- -0.094 --- 0.186 0.155 0.095 --- 0.070 --- --- 0.143* --- 0.009 0.048 
   (0.628)  (0.240) (0.620) (0.299)  (0.636)   (0.071)  (0.896) (0.621) 
Foreign Aid  --- --- 0.0004 --- -0.002 -0.000 0.002 --- -0.000 --- --- 0.0005 --- 0.001 -0.0003 
   (0.900)  (0.638) (0.988) (0.256)  (0.989)   (0.875)  (0.664) (0.852) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.003 --- --- --- -0.004* --- -0.001 --- --- -0.001 --- -0.005 -0.001 
   (0.213)    (0.053)  (0.581)   (0.711)  (0.145) (0.421) 
                
AR(1) 0.967 -0.745 -1.364 -0.859 -1.380 -0.935 -1.108 -0.740 -1.247 -0.708 -0.721 -1.285 -0.793 -1.361 -1.242 
 (0.333) (0.455) (0.172) (0.390) (0.167) (0.349) (0.267) ([0.459) (0.212) (0.478) (0.470) (0.198) (0.427) (0.173) (0.213) 
AR(2) -0.885 -0.153 -1.097 0.120 -1.021 -0.088 -0.687 0.543 -0.587 -1.250 0.403 -0.796 0.550 -1.082 -0.643 
 (0.375) (0.877) (0.272) (0.904) (0.307) (0.929) (0.491) (0.587) (0.556) (0.211) (0.686) (0.426) (0.582) (0.278) (0.519) 
Sargan OIR 0.996 5.102 4.923 2.594 2.764 4.918 4.256 2.918 10.621 1.637 3.887 9.110 1.981 10.095 13.395 
Wald 0.207 23.06*** 22.55*** 17.60*** 18.78** 41.6*** 32.89*** 6.620 40.8*** 7.910** 1.228 25.30*** 4.381 21.01** 49.72*** 
 (0.976) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.019) (0.746) (0.002) (0.223) (0.012) (0.000) 
Countries  5 9 13 9 11 11 17 7 19 4 5 19 6 17 22 
Observations  73 129 95 56 77 72 114 81 125 60 69 129 77 116 149 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. Gov’t: Government. Ivt: Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the 
Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 4: Conditional Convergence (Second Specification) 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  0.33*** 0.357 -0.037 -0.40*** -0.092 -0.32*** -0.32*** 0.292 -0.33*** 0.618 -0.31*** -0.223 0.59*** -0.33*** -0.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.750) (0.654) (0.000) (0.376) (0.000) (0.000) (0.269) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.293* 0.053 0.133 -0.617 -0.012 -0.422 -0.263 -0.002 -0.257 0.027 -0.258 -0.097 5.001 0.102 -0.197 
 (0.097) (0.445) (0.364) (0.265) (0.927) (0.454) (0.338) (0.986) (0.323) (0.118) (0.408) (0.308) (0.410) (0.660) (0.455) 
Public  Investment  -0.013 0.002 -0.009 0.032 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.024 --- 0.009 -0.005 -0.610 0.022 0.024 
 (0.442) (0.590) (0.246) (0.473) (0.518) (0.901) (0.422) (0.784) (0.453)  (0.444) (0.456) (0.334) (0.516) (0.474) 
Trade -0.002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.023** 0.0001 0.009 0.004 0.0001 0.004 --- 0.007 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.003 
 (0.185) (0.337) (0.634) (0.012) (0.775) (0.106) (0.277) (0.851) (0.255)  (0.295) (0.967) (0.612) (0.558) (0.283) 
Priv.  Capital Flows --- -0.002 0.003 -0.09** 0.004 -0.018 -0.013 -0.006 -0.015 --- -0.020 0.003 -0.291 -0.005 -0.014 
  (0.412) (0.472) (0.044) (0.414) (0.486) (0.505) (0.295) (0.362)  (0.245) (0.705) (0.514) (0.763) (0.523) 
GDPpc  Growth  --- 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.015 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.013 --- --- 0.018 0.181 0.040 0.011 
  (0.308) (0.601) (0.795) (0.501) (0.768) (0.393) (0.842) (0.359)   (0.289) (0.387) (0.284) (0.480) 
Rule of Law   --- -0.009 0.025 -0.415 -0.008 -0.093 -0.200 --- -0.197 --- --- -0.043 --- -0.111 -0.196 
  (0.668) (0.531) (0.322) (0.833) (0.715) (0.292)  (0.198)   (0.618)  (0.687) (0.322) 
Liquid Liabilities  --- -0.074 -0.137 -3.65*** -0.014 -0.120 -0.342 --- -0.450 --- --- 0.150 --- -0.460 -0.425 
  (0.543) (0.394) (0.004) (0.945) (0.836) (0.456)  (0.436)   (0.224)  (0.356) (0.299) 
Foreign Aid (DAC) --- --- 0.0003 --- 0.002 -0.002 -0.015 --- -0.018 --- --- 0.005 --- -0.027 -0.020 
   (0.974)  (0.588) (0.911) (0.504)  (0.443)   (0.405)  (0.567) (0.442) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.0004 -0.013 0.0001 -0.002 -0.002 --- -0.002 --- --- 0.001 --- -0.009 -0.001 
   (0.294) (0.149) (0.910) (0.127) (0.102)  (0.199)   (0.601)  (0.266) (0.104) 
                
AR(1) -1.062 -0.816 -1.492 -1.033 -1.224 -1.070 -1.042 -1.915* -1.034 -1.357 -1.037 -1.327 -1.004 -1.013 -1.034 
 (0.287) (0.414) (0.135) (0.301) (0.220) (0.284) (0.297) (0.055) (0.300) (0.174) (0.299) (0.184) (0.314) (0.310) (0.300) 
AR(2) -0.996 0.734 -0.935 -0.937 -0.988 -0.884 -1.099 0.304 -1.132 -1.227 -0.789 -0.921 -1.001 -1.092 -1.135 
 (0.319) (0.462) (0.349) (0.348) (0.322) (0.376) (0.271) (0.760) (0.257) (0.219) (0.430) (0.356) (0.316) (0.274) (0.256) 
Sargan OIR 1.007 3.111 6.043 5.279 4.002 4.692 10.614 3.333 15.647 2.232 1.784 17.049 8.641 10.380 24.748 
Wald 133*** 93.38*** 8.576 1616*** 4.629 2666*** 2144*** 4.684 3320*** 1.674 120.3*** 37.12*** 8715*** 10261*** 3333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.000) (0.865) (0.000) (0.000) (0.455) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  5 10 14 14 13 15 22 9 25 4 7 23 10 19 28 
Observations  73 69 98 83 86 95 148 92 161 60 73 146 120 125 181 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. Priv: Private. GDPpc: GDP per capita. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR 
test.
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
  
     
Capital Flight 3.647 28.643 -13.637 399.14 540 
  
     
Expenditure  Government Expenditure  4.015 10.790 -68.238 80.449 376 
Public Expenditure  7.704 4.636 0.000 30.120 487 
  
     
Globalization  Trade Openness  69.503 38.157 8.199 246.89 557 
Foreign Direct Investment 2.300 4.393 -16.118 35.190 485 
Private Capital Flows  2.410 4.555 -16.118 35.295 489 
  
     
Institutional 
Quality  
Regulation Quality  -0.606 0.607 -2.526 0.857 293 
Rule of Law -0.697 0.648 -2.312 0.863 294 
       
Economic 
Prosperity  
GDP growth  3.539 4.624 -29.178 24.176 559 
GDP per capita growth   1.060 4.407 -23.539 23.104 564 
       
Foreign Aid Total  NODA 10.223 9.915 0.054 62.344 559 
NODA from DAC countries  6.062 6.144 -0.175 53.017 559 
       
Finance and 
Inflation  
Money  Supply 0.305 0.202 0.001 1.224 472 
Liquid Liabilities  0.235 0.186 0.001 1.017 474 
Inflation  105.80 1226.3 -100.00 24411 520 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categorization  
Upper Middle Income 0.162 0.368 0.000 1.000 592 
Lower Middle Income 0.297 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
Middle Income 0.459 0.498 0.000 1.000 592 
Low Income  0.540 0.498 0.000 1.000 592 
English  0.405 0.491 0.000 1.000 592 
French  0.594 0.491 0.000 1.000 592 
Christianity  0.702 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
Islam   0.297 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.891 0.310 0.000 1.000 592 
North Africa  0.108 0.310 0.000 1.000 592 
Oil  0.216 0.412 0.000 1.000 592 
Non-oil 0.783 0.412 0.000 1.000 592 
Conflict  0.297 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
Non-conflict  0.702 0.457 0.000 1.000 592 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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    Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix  
                
Expenditure (Ex) Financial Openness Trade Institutional Quality Economic Prosperity Foreign Aid (NODA) Finance  Capital  
Gov. Ex Pub. Ivt FDI PCF Openness R.Q R.L GDPg GDPpcg Total DAC M2 LL Inflation Flight  
1.000 0.098 0.080 0.082 0.101 0.014 0.028 0.332 0.344 0.038 0.044 -0.033 -0.018 -0.356 -0.070 Gov. Ex 
 1.000 0.116 0.111 0.227 0.231 0.383 0.146 0.163 0.261 0.269 0.181 0.151 -0.108 -0.148 Pub. Ex 
  1.000 0.982 0.511 -0.153 0.097 0.128 0.176 -0.084 -0.063 0.145 0.185 0.056 -0.060 FDI 
   1.000 0.504 -0.150 0.108 0.117 0.172 -0.068 -0.040 0.167 0.208 0.054 -0.068 PCF 
    1.000 0.032 0.218 0.107 0.163 -0.110 -0.088 0.196 0.257 0.018 -0.049 Trade 
     1.000 0.791 0.146 0.170 -0.163 -0.179 0.301 0.370 -0.193 -0.049 R.Q 
      1.000 0.091 0.161 -0.109 -0.119 0.590 0.636 -0.128 -0.025 R.L 
       1.000 0.973 0.047 0.041 0.011 0.025 -0.197 0.069 GDPg 
        1.000 0.056 0.059 0.085 0.106 -0.189 0.053 GDPpcg 
         1.000 0.953 -0.260 -0.286 -0.012 -0.080 Total Aid 
          1.000 -0.218 -0.253 0.004 -0.062 DAC Aid 
           1.000 0.967 -0.084 0.004 M2 
            1.000 -0.082 0.004 LL 
             1.000 -0.009 Inflation 
              1.000 Cap. Fight 
                
Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. PCF: Private Capital Flows. R.Q: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GDPg: GDP 
growth. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. στDA: σet τfficial Development Assistance. Total: Total στDA. DAC: στDA from ‘Development Assistance Committee’ countries. M2: 
Money Supply. LL: Liquid Liabilities.  
           
 
                                          
 26 
Appendix 3: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment  Pub. Ivt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Investment  FDI Foreign  Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Capital  Flows  PCF  Private Capital Flows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness  Trade  Imports plus Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality  R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP  Growth  GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP per capita Growth  GDPpcg Average annual GDP per capita growth rate  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (1) Total  Aid Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (2) DAC Aid NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Depth M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Liquid Liabilities  LL Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank 
(FDSD) 
    
Inflation  Inflation  Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Capital Flight  Cap. Flight  Capital Flight (constant of  2010 in % of GDP) Boyce & 
Ndikumana (2012)  
    
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  NODA: Net Official Development 
Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle 
Income  
Botswana, Algeria, South Africa, Gabon, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles.  6 
   
Lower Middle 
Income  
Tunisia, Lesotho, σigeria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Swaziland, Sudan, Egypt, 
Morocco, Angola, Cape Verde. 
11 
 
Middle 
Income  
Botswana, Algeria, South Africa, Gabon, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
Tunisia, Lesotho, σigeria, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Swaziland, Sudan, Egypt, 
Morocco, Angola, Cape Verde.  
17 
   
Low Income  Burkina Faso, Uganda, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Malawi, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Central African Republic, Zambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,  
Zimbabwe.  
20 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Sudan, Kenya, 
Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe.   
    15 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Egypt, Central African Republic, Morocco, Guinea, Mauritania, 
Gabon, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe.   
 
22 
    
 
Religious 
Domination 
 
 
Christianity  
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Malawi, 
Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Swaziland, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Zambia, South Africa, 
Gabon, Angola, Tanzania, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
Zimbabwe.  
 
26 
 
  
Islam  Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone.  
11 
    
 
Regions  
 
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Sudan, Kenya, 
Zambia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Madagascar,  Central 
African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Angola, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & 
Principe.     
 
   33 
   
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia.  4 
   
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Nigeria, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Sudan, Algeria, Gabon, Angola. 8 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland,  Kenya, Zambia, South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, 
Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar,  Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé 
& Principe, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
29 
   
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Uganda, Mozambique, Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, South Africa, Angola, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe.   
  11 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Botswana, Lesotho, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Swaziland, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, 
Seychelles , Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo Republic, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Madagascar,  Central African Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Gabon, Cape Verde, 
Sao Tomé & Principe, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 
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Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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